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Abstract: There is an on-going debate between neo-Malthusians and Cornucopians about the 
state and trends of the world’s environment. Two key contributions to this debate were The 
Global 2000 Report to the President and, The Resourceful Earth, both published at the 
beginning of the 1980s and looking forward to the year 2000. This paper compares the 
predictions and analysis of the two reports with the situation in the year 2000 to ascertain their 
accuracy. In terms of predicting the future, The Resourceful Earth relied heavily upon 
examining past trends as giving the best indication of the future; Global 2000 gave somewhat 
less emphasis to past trends and also tried to analyze directly the factors that it saw as being 
likely to influence the future. Broadly speaking, Global 2000 was overly pessimistic, while The 
Resourceful Earth was more accurate in predicting that with many basic parameters relating to 
human existence the trends of improvement of earlier years would continue. Neither report dealt 
adequately with questions relating to adaptive capacity and its impact on predictions of the 
future. 
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Introduction 
 
There is an on-going debate about whether or not the human situation is improving or becoming 
more unstable as population growth and economic development continue in most areas of the 
world. A current example of this debate is the discussion that has been generated by Lomborg’s 
The Skeptical Environmentalist [1]. In this book Lomborg examines, using the best available 
data, whether or not human existence on earth is becoming more or less precarious and whether 
or not quality of life and the environment, broadly speaking, are improving or deteriorating. 
Lomborg’s book sparked a fierce debate in the literature about the validity of his findings. 
Nature [2], Science [3], and Scientific American [4] published critical or highly critical reviews, 
while The Economist [5] and Le Scienze [6] published in favor of Lomborg’s work. 
 
This debate, however, is just one round between two opposing world views, often labeled as the 
cornucopians and the neo-Malthusians [7].1 The Cornucopian perspective holds that natural 
resources are not in short supply, as human ability to adapt is generally able to compensate for 
shortages that do appear in relation to particular resources.2 The opposing Neo-Malthusian 
perspective holds that there are severe limits to growth and resource use which are further 
aggravated by pollution and subsequent resource degradation.3 Essentially it argues that, 
unchecked, population growth will exceed the earth’s carrying capacity thereby leading to 
                                                          
1
 There are other approaches, such as those outlined by Dryzek [8]. Still the two that generate 
the most vehement debate are the cornucopians and the neo-Malthusians. 
2
 Other names used to label the Cornucopian perspective include techno-fix and promethean. 
3
 The Neo-Malthusian’s viewpoint is also referred to as the Cassandra perspective, a self 
labeled term. 
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disaster. Table 1 lists some of the major contributions to the Cornucopian / neo-Malthusian 
debate over the last 40 years.4 
 
{table 1 about here} 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, one of the crescendos of the debate occurred in the early 1980s. At 
this time two landmark studies were published: Julian Simon’s The Ultimate Resource, and The 
Global 2000 Report to the President. Simon [8] when looking at long term trends stated that the 
situation of humanity is improving, thanks to human ingenuity and hence human capital is the 
ultimate resource. Global 2000 was a study undertaken by US Federal agencies at the behest of 
President Carter to assess the likely problems humanity would face in the future, specifically 
the next 20 years. To this end an interactive multi-agency forecasting and deliberative process 
was initiated, that drew upon the skills of some of the US’s top scientists.  The final report 
suggested that humanity was likely to face serious hardships. In particular, it forecasted stresses 
relating to the interaction between population, resources and environment, with life for many 
people being more precarious as a result. The report was, however, meant to be a policy 
relevant document that would promote and guide governmental and public action rather than a 
purely objective scientific prediction of the year 2000. Due in part to its ideological outlook, its 
findings were subsequently rejected by the Regan administration. 
 
In response to this report, Simon and Kahn [9] asked a number of distinguished scientists to 
assess the assumption and forecasts of Global 2000. Their critique entitled The Resourceful 
Earth came out in 1984 and argued that Global 2000 was wrong in its forecasts. As with Global 
2000, this critique also had its own policy-orientated agenda, thus the critique was also not a 
purely objective scientific prediction of 2000.   This was one of the few times in the history of 
                                                          
4
 Due to large number of publications relating to this debate, only some of the key contributions 
can be listed here due to space limitations.  
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this debate that a comprehensive forecast was undertaken and critically reviewed almost 
concurrently. As most of the debate has focused on the future only limited attention has been 
given to systematic appraisals of past forecasts. Yet systematic appraisals of past forecasts are 
critical though both in terms of assessing the validity of the arguments of both sides but also to 
provide an indication of how useful and accurate current predictions relating to the global 
environment and human well-being are likely to be. 
 
The debate between the Cornucopians and neo-Malthusians has progressed over time, with the 
focus shifting from a debate largely about the adequacy of natural resources for meeting human 
needs to a focus on the ability of the biosphere to cope with growing human impacts. Global 
2000 captured the early stages of this shift by examining each of its resource predictions in 
terms of the likely effect on the environment, with this environmental analysis taking up almost 
half of the section on future predictions. Unfortunately, however, much of this environmental 
analysis largely repeated what was said in the earlier chapters of the report. The Resourceful 
Earth, being a multi-edited book, varied considerably in the focus of each chapter. As a whole, 
it was, as its name suggests, focused upon resource issues but it did deal with ecological and 
environmental consequences of increased resource use, and the chapters on long-run trends in 
environmental quality, and air and water quality both focused almost entirely upon 
environmental quality trends rather than resources adequacy. 
 
This paper compares the predictions and analysis of Global 2000 for the year 2000 with the 
present to ascertain how accurate was the report, and why. The criticisms of Global 2000 given 
in The Resourceful Earth are then examined to ascertain their validity. Because of the length of 
the two reports together with their repetitiveness in places, only the key predictions and analysis 
are examined. As a result the presentations given in this paper are brief and cannot do justice to 
any issue in depth. The paper concludes with an examination of the two reports as a whole to 
deduce whether the relatively pessimistic conclusions of Global 2000 compared to the more 
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optimistic conclusions of The Resourceful Earth presented a more accurate vision of what the 
year 2000 was actually like, and what implications this has for the cornucopian – neo-
Malthusian debate twenty years on. 
 
It should be noted from the start that there are serious methodological difficulties associated 
with long term forecasts, including problems relating to the data upon which the predictions are 
based, problems of scale, of aggregation, and of assumptions about the linearity of ecological 
and socio-economic processes. Being clear about the methodological difficulties of forecasts is 
important when making predictions, but to some scientists, any long term forecast, whatever its 
direction is rendered virtually useless by such difficulties. Nonetheless, forecasts continue to be 
made and their validity discussed. 
 
In preparing this paper careful attention was paid to ensure that similar or compatible data 
sources were used for the year 2000 to those data used by Global 2000 and The Resourceful 
Earth. Thus where possible, data from the same (or equivalent) US government agency or 
international organization was used for comparison, at times supplemented with data or 
information from the general scientific literature where appropriate. Despite, this, data 
definitions have varied over time and by source, particularly with resources such as forests. In 
such cases where compatibility is doubtful, it can be more appropriate to look how rates of 
exploitation or growth have changed compared to predictions in order to avoid being misled by 
absolute figures.  
 
 
The Global 2000 Report to the President and The Resourceful Earth: An overview 
 
Global 2000 largely based its trend projections that were used to form its conclusions on the 
long-term data and models developed by the US government federal agencies. Because the 
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models of the different federal agencies were not designed to be used in an interactive manner, 
interaction between the models was limited to developing projections sequentially. Population 
and Gross National Product (GNP) projections were used to estimate demand in the resource 
sectors, and all of these projections were then used to prepare the environment projections [10]. 
While this sequential process allowed limited interaction among the elements of the study, 
continuous interaction and feedbacks between the models employed was not possible. It was 
possible, however, for the different agencies involved to comment upon the results prepared 
from other agencies and this feedback to be incorporated back into the modeling process. 
 
Global 2000 begins its major findings and conclusions chapter by stating that: 
 
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, 
more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to 
disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving 
population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. 
Despite greater material output, the world’s people will be poorer in 
many ways than they are today. 
 
For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for food 
and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will be worse. 
Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on 
earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now – unless the nations 
of the world act decisively to alter current trends. 
[10] (p1 of Volume 1) 
 
Global 2000 went on in subsequent paragraphs to outline in greater detail what global 
conditions would be like in the year 2000. Specifically, it said that there would be continuing 
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rapid population growth, slightly lower in percentage terms but greater in absolute numbers 
than in 1975 [10]. Economic growth would continue in most countries, but at the same time, in 
most less developed countries Gross National Product (GNP) per capita would remain very low. 
While food production was projected to increase on a per capita basis, most of that increase was 
predicted to go to countries with relatively high per capita consumption, while per capita 
consumption in many less developed regions of the world was expected to scarcely improve or 
even decline.  Real food prices were expected to double. Global oil production was predicted to 
peak in the 1990s. While richer industrialized nations were expected to be able to cope with the 
associated energy price increases that were expected, many less developed nations were 
predicted to have increasing difficulties meeting their energy needs, and for the quarter of the 
human population dependent on wood for fuel, the outlook was seen as being bleak. 
 
On a slightly more positive note, Global 2000 suggested that non-fuel mineral resources were 
sufficient to meet demands through to the year 2000, although disproportionate use by 
industrialized countries would continue [10]. However, regional water shortages were expected 
to worsen, global deforestation would continue at an alarming rate, as would plant and animal 
extinctions and agricultural land degradation. Radioactive and other hazardous materials would 
present increasing health and safety problems in a growing number of countries. 
 
Despite such serious problems, Global 2000 did conclude that the situation was not hopeless 
since the study’s projections were based on the assumption that relevant national policies and 
programs would remain essentially unchanged through to the year 2000, even though policies 
were already beginning to change [10]. Such changes, so far however, were not seen as being 
adequate, with the report saying that a period of unprecedented co-operation and commitment 
between nations was essential. Without prompt and vigorous changes in public policy around 
the world, Global 2000 suggested that the world’s problems would become unmanageable, with 
any delay likely to seriously reduce options for effective action. 
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In The Resourceful Earth no attempt was made to reach an agreed upon synthesis of all 
chapters. There is no formal conclusion or summary chapter of key findings. However, in the 
introduction a broad outline and summary is given. To highlight the difference between the two 
reports in the clearest possible terms, the first two paragraphs of Global 2000, as quoted above, 
were reworded in this introduction in the light of what was presented in the subsequent pages of 
The Resourceful Earth: 
 
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be less crowded 
(though more populated), less polluted, more stable ecologically, and 
less vulnerable to resource-supply disruption than the world we live in 
now. Stresses involving population, resources, and environment will be 
less in the future than now… The world’s people will be richer in most 
ways than they are today… The outlook for food and other necessities 
of life will be better… life for most of the people on earth will be less 
precarious economically than it is now. 
[9] ( p1-2: italics and shortenings in original) 
 
Simon and Kahn [9] went on to state that the then present global trends in life expectancy, birth 
rates, food supply, deforestation, and availability of oil and mineral resources were generally 
improving rather than worsening, while problems relating to matters such as climate change, 
water scarcity and species loss were much less significant than was frequently suggested. They 
argued that although all was not necessarily well then nor would everything necessarily be well 
in the future, global trends which indicated that things were generally improving rather than 
deteriorating could be expected to continue in the future as humans, both individually and 
collectively, continued to address the problems they face. 
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Perhaps the most important point of divergence between the two works is in their assumptions 
regarding the endogeniety of policy responses. Global 2000 qualifies its findings with an 
assumption that current polices will continue. In contrast, Simon and Kahn [30] argue that 
throughout history individuals and communities have always responded and adapted to changes 
in their environment and so basing predictions on past trends implies that this adaptation will 
continue and hence policies will be modified. In The Resourceful Earth, each of the major 
conclusions of Global 2000 is challenged by showing either that the statement itself is 
meaningless because it is too vague or value laden, that there is no evidence to back up the 
claim, or that global trends clearly imply the opposite. 
 
Did Global 2000’s projections materialize ? 
 
As noted in the introduction to The Resourceful Earth, much of the language used in the 
introduction to Global 2000 was vague at key points, making it difficult to evaluate in a 
quantifiable way [9]. To assess the accuracy of Global 2000, the projections specified within it 
that are most closely connected to the report’s overall conclusions are compared in the 
following subsections with what the year 2000 (or which ever year prior to that was chosen as 
the target year for a prediction) was actually like. The results of this comparison allow an 
evaluation also of the critique provided by The Resourceful Earth. The years 1980 through to 
2000 are referred to below as the study period. 
 
Population projections: 
 
In Global 2000 high, medium and low population projections were given with the high and low 
projections “representing the highest and lowest population counts that may reasonably be 
expected to occur” and the medium representing “reasonable” projections [10]. World 
population was predicted to increase from around 4 billion in 1975 to 6.35 billion in 2000, an 
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increase of more than fifty percent.5 The high medium and low population projections for the 
world and a select range of countries are given in Table 2. 
 
{table 2 about here} 
 
The total fertility rates estimated by the Bureau of Census for the year 2000 for its high, 
medium and low population projections were 3.9,  3.3,  and 2.8 respectively [10]. The actual 
estimated total fertility rate in 2000 was 2.7 [11], thus slightly below the low estimate of 
fertility. Overall, world population reached 6.08 billion in 2000, which is near to the lower end 
of the range included in Global 2000’s projections and 4.5 percent below the medium 
projection. This may validate Perlman’s [12] observation that such projections have rarely stood 
the test of time. Perlman goes on to argue in The Resourceful Earth that population projections 
in themselves are not very relevant to the main concerns of Global 2000, since the empirical 
evidence indicates no negative correlation between the rate of population growth and the 
standard of living, and thus no negative effect upon the state of natural resource availability. 
This contention can only be tested by looking at the other subjects dealt with in Global 2000. 
 
Food and agricultural projections 
 
Global 2000 included three scenarios in its projections for the food and agricultural situation of 
the world in 2000. Alternative 1 was the base line projection, while alternatives 2 and 3 
                                                          
5
 Two sets of population projections were given in Global 2000, one set prepared by the US 
Bureau of the Census, the other by the US Community and Family Study Center. In the Major 
Findings and Conclusions chapter, only the set prepared by the Bureau of Census is referred to, 
indicating that this set is the primary population projection of the report. The population 
projections do not take into consideration international migration, with this factor likely to 
explain the relatively low projections of the US population in 2000 compared to reality. 
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represented the upper optimistic and lower pessimistic bounds of their projections in terms of 
population and income growth rates. While all the scenarios painted for developed countries 
were relatively optimistic, with more than adequate food supplies continuing, even in the 
optimistic projection for less developed countries in per capita food consumption suggested that 
gains were likely to be small and unevenly distributed. In the pessimistic projection per capita 
levels were not projected to grow at all [10]. 
 
The Global 2000 report does not state clearly how food production was defined and thus it is 
difficult to ensure that any comparison with the present is entirely consistent. Nonetheless, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) includes a food production index on its internet site 
that allows temporal comparisons within the database, thus ensuring some degree of 
consistency. A comparison between the basic projections given in Global 2000 and the actual 
production is shown in Table 3. 
 
{table 3 about here} 
 
Table 3 shows that the overall food production projections in Global 2000 were relatively 
accurate, but at the same time, they were spectacularly incorrect for some individual countries 
or regions. Production in the former Soviet Union was less than half the projection, while that 
of China was more than twice the projection. Given the significant proportion of the human 
population which is concentrated in China, China’s unexpectedly good performance is very 
significant to the world’s overall food situation. The inability to accurately predict the food 
situation in these two countries perhaps highlights the importance of effective social systems 
and adaptive capacity relative to the basic natural resources endowment and population size.  
 
Reality was considerably better than implied by overall food production. Not only was total 
food production slightly higher than predicted by Global 2000 but given that population growth 
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was slower than predicted (that is, the medium projection which was considered the most 
likely) global per capita food production was much higher than expected. 
 
Global 2000 also prepared two scenarios of  daily per capita calorie consumption (tables 6-8, 6-
9 and 13-17 of report). Scenario A assumed that the real price of energy would remain constant, 
low population growth, high income growth, and favorable weather would occur. Scenario B 
assumed that the real price of energy would increase, there would be high population growth, 
low income growth and less favorable weather.6 In Figure 1 a summary of these projections is 
compared to the average daily per capita calorie consumption in 1997-99 (the most recent year 
for which data are available). It shows that reality turned out to be significantly better than even 
the optimistic scenario predicted. While the average for less developed countries was 93 percent 
of the FAO recommended minimum calorie requirement in 1973-74, by 1997-99 this had risen 
to 117 percent. The optimistic scenario predicted by Global 2000 only had this rising to 104 
percent, while the pessimistic scenario only expected a one percent rise to 94 percent. By 1997-
99 the only region with a daily calorie consumption below the recommended level was sub-
Saharan Africa, at 94 percent of the daily recommended intake and even this region was ahead 
of the average for less developed countries in 1973-74. 
 
{Figure 1 about here} 
 
It is important to note when evaluating Figure 1 that achieving an average daily per capita 
consumption of 100 per cent of the FAO recommended level in a country will still mean that a 
large number of people in that country may be malnourished. Skewed caloric consumption 
means that average daily per capita consumption needs to be 110-125 percent of the minimum 
to ensure that all income classes are consuming above the minimum recommended level [10]. 
                                                          
6
 On page 85 of Global 2000, the authors expressed the view that energy prices were certain to 
increase. 
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Because of this, even Global 2000’s optimistic scenario, which predicted that the daily calorie 
consumption in less developed countries would rise to 104 percent of needs, suggested 
significant malnutrition would remain in the developing world. Conversely, caloric 
consumption does not continue to rise indefinitely as incomes rise. Once a certain level is 
reached consumption will plateau, as has occurred in the developed world. 
 
The Resourceful Earth painted a more optimistic picture of the state of the world’s food 
resources in the year 2000 than did Global 2000. In its chapter on world food and agriculture, 
Johnson [13] noted that there had been modest improvements in per capita food supplies in low 
income countries in the previous three decades and that real prices of major foods had been 
declining. An increasing rate of growth of per capita food production in developing countries 
was thought to be likely. International trade in grain had grown rapidly during the 1970s and a 
world food system had developed which had substantially reduced the risks of food shortages, 
famine, and hunger resulting from natural disasters, with most people in the world being 
expected to be able to participate in this system by the end of the century [13]. 
 
The analysis presented in The Resourceful Earth showed that despite considerable variability 
over the short term, real price trends of most major agricultural commodities had declined over 
the previous century due largely to rising productivity [13]. Johnson [13] was particularly 
critical of the conclusions put forward in Global 2000 that there would be large increases in the 
real price of food by the year 2000 together with a substantial increase in the share of the 
world’s resources committed to food production, arguing that the available evidence suggested 
that such conclusions were simply not possible. Data for the year 2000, shows that Johnson’s 
[13] criticism was well founded. The World Bank commodity price index for food shows a peak 
in the mid-1970s followed by a steady and dramatic decline. When the 1990 global food price is 
equal to 100, then the price of food fell from 223 in 1975 to 193 in 1980, 126 in 1985, 98 in 
1995, and 84 in 2000 [14]. However, global food prices are heavily affected by agricultural 
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subsidies, meaning that ascertaining whether the real cost of producing food is increasing or 
decreasing over time is very difficult, even if these figures do show a dramatic decline in prices 
and thus suggest falling costs. 
 
In the environmental section of Global 2000 there was discussion relating to impacts on the 
environment of increasing food production. It was argued that agricultural and grazing lands of 
parts of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America could not be expected to retain their 
then present productivity with another two decades of intensifying pressures, with population 
growth making major loss of biological life support capacity virtually inevitable [10]. Global 
2000 predicted that without major policy change, there would be a general worldwide 
deterioration of soils quality that would significantly interfere with achieving the production 
levels projected. There is no reliable worldwide estimate of the condition of soils thus it is not 
possible to assess Global 2000’s predictions directly. Rozanov et al [15], for example, estimate 
that the amount of lands whose soils have been severely damaged or rendered useless for 
agriculture exceeds the surface area that is currently cultivated. Their estimate, however, 
considers loses and degradation over the past 300 years and was made less than half way 
through the study period. Given the food production increases that were achieved during the 
study period together with the falling real price of food that has occurred over the same period, 
Global 2000 was either unduly pessimistic about the environmental impacts of agriculture, or 
else those impacts were better managed and the effects of those impacts were less than 
expected. 
 
Fishery projections 
 
Global 2000 stated that naturally produced fish leveled off in the 1970s at about 70 million 
tonnes a year, 60 million tonnes from marine fisheries, and 10 million tonnes from freshwater 
fisheries, with no-further sustainable increase likely. In 1975, around 6 million tonnes of food 
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was produced by aquaculture each year according to Global 2000, with Global 2000 indicating 
that there was significant scope for this to be expanded over the coming decades, citing the 
conclusion of a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conference on aquaculture which 
stated that a 5-10 fold increase in production would be possible by the year 2000. 
 
According to the FAO [16] approximately 86 million tonnes of fish were produced from marine 
fisheries, and around 9 million tonnes from fresh water fisheries in 2000. The total fisheries 
catch was around 95 million tonnes. Thirty-six million tonnes of food was also being produced 
by aquaculture in 2000. Based on this FAO data it would appear that Global 2000 was unduly 
pessimistic with regards to the world’s potential fisheries, although relatively accurate with 
regards to aquaculture. 
 
In The Resourceful Earth it was stated that marine fisheries would probably grow over the 
coming twenty years and reach 100-120 million tonnes a year of conventional species around 
the turn of the century. Aquaculture was not thought likely to increase its contribution to the 
world food supply very much by the year 2000, with other options for increasing natural 
fisheries likely to be able to produce food at lower cost. Given that the marine fish catch was 
around 86 million tonnes in 2000 and aquaculture produced around 36 million tonnes of food, it 
would seem that The Resourceful Earth was unduly optimistic with regards to marine fisheries 
and unduly pessimistic with regards to aquaculture. 
 
One of the problems with the data of fish production produced by the FAO, the source of the 
data used by Global 2000 and The Resourceful Earth, and hence for present day comparisons, is 
that the FAO as an international organization must rely upon the data supplied to it by member 
countries, even when those data are of doubtful quality [17]. Watson and Pauly [17] note that 
global fish catches were widely expected to plateau in the 1990s at around 80 million tonnes 
and yet catches reported by the FAO continued to increase, largely driven by catch reports from 
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China. Comparison of expected fish catches that were produced by modeling world fisheries 
with reported fish catches revealed significant differences in areas along the Chinese coast, with 
the large absolute value of these catches strongly affecting the global total. Watson and Pauly 
[17] believe that the reason for the over-reporting by China of its fisheries output is a result of 
having the same state entities which monitor the economy also being responsible for increasing 
its output, whereas in most countries under-reporting tends to be more of a problem. By 
substituting more realistic estimates of the Chinese fishing catch into the FAO statistics, a 
declining rather than increasing trend in fisheries catches since 1988 is revealed. According to 
Botsford et al [18] nearly half of world’s individual fish stocks are fully exploited and a further 
22 percent are over exploited. Therefore, given that world fisheries are in slight decline at 
present and there is significant over exploitation of some fish stocks, it appears that Global 
2000 was nearer to reality than The Resourceful Earth in its analysis and predictions. 
Furthermore, global totals fail to consider the quality of fisheries and whether or not more 
desirable species are being over fished, with desirable species over time being replaced in 
catches by less desirable species.  
 
Forestry and Biodiversity Projections 
 
In Global 2000 it was estimated that the global forest cover would shrink from one-fifth of the 
world’s land area (2,655 million hectares) in 1978 to one-sixth of the land area in the year 2000. 
While checking this estimate is difficult due to variations in the definition of what constitutes a 
forest, this estimate was based upon the annual deforestation rate remaining constant at between 
18 and 20 million hectares. Global 2000 stated that land use for forests versus agriculture was 
approximately in equilibrium in the industrialized countries of the world, meaning that most of 
the net deforestation would take place in developing countries, much of it in tropical rainforests 
[10]. 
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According to the FAO, the net global deforestation rate between 1990 and 2000 was only 9.4 
million hectares [19]. The loss of natural forest in tropical areas was 15.2 million hectares and 
was compensated partly by the afforestation and the conversion of forests to plantations, as well 
as the natural expansion of forests, particularly in temperate areas. Furthermore, the FAO 
estimated that the total forest area of the world in 2000 was 3869 million hectares [19]. That 
this figure is much higher than the estimate given in Global 2000 twenty-two years earlier is 
due to different definitions of what constitutes a forest; a less stringent definition which results 
in a much larger percentage of the world’s land area being forested logically should suggest that 
all things being equal, statistically speaking a higher deforestation rate will be recorded simply 
because there is more forest area potentially available for deforestation. The FAO’s data, 
therefore, suggests that current deforestation rates are significantly lower than those predicted in 
Global 2000. Global totals, however, say nothing about the biological health and diversity of 
the forested area. 
 
In its discussion relating to deforestation, Global 2000 commented on a number of problems 
arising from deforestation, including the acceleration of runoff  and erosion, siltation, loss of 
ecological diversity, micro-climate changes, and permanent loss of genetic resources [10]. 
Between 437,000 and 1,875,000 species were predicted to be lost during the study period, 
depending upon the rate of deforestation and other factors, with this being as much as 20 
percent of the three to ten million species thought to be present on Earth at that time [10]. 
 
The Resourceful Earth presented a more optimistic analysis of the world’s forests than was 
presented in Global 2000. Sedjo and Clawson [20] argued that there was little to suggest that 
major regions of the world would be denuded of their forests in any reasonable time horizon, 
although in some regions excessive deforestation was occurring. They saw serious 
environmental damage from forest utilization as a local rather than global problem since there 
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was little danger of the wholesale destruction of the world’s virgin tropical forests in the 
foreseeable future, with the risk of serious loss of genetic resources being exaggerated. 
 
Estimating the actual loss of genetic resources over period of 1980 to 2000 is very difficult due 
to the level of uncertainty regarding number of species and their extinction rates. Habitat loss in 
some of the world’s most biologically rich areas suggests that extinction rates must be high, and 
extinction rates have been made for a few intensively studies species groups such as mammals. 
However, extrapolating from one group, such as mammals relies upon these rates being 
representative of completely different taxa [21]. Hence with the paucity of reliable data few 
global estimates of species loss based upon methodologically sound research are available. 
 
Estimates of both background (natural) extinction rates and current extinction rates remain 
highly uncertain [21]. Estimates also vary due to uncertainty about the total number of species 
present on Earth, together with uncertainty about the precise distribution of those species. 
Hughes et al [22] state that assuming that there are 14 million species globally and that two-
thirds of all species exist in tropical forests, then between 14,000 and 40,000 species are being 
lost each year. While this estimate is comparable to the figures stated in Global 2000, in reality 
it suggests a much lower rate than that given in Global 2000 because this current estimate 
depends upon a much greater estimate of the total number of species and hence the total 
percentage of species lost is much lower. Woodruff [23] estimates that at least 250,000 species 
went extinct in the twentieth century, an estimate that is between 13 and 57 percent of that 
given in Global 2000 for just the last twenty years of the twentieth century. Given the high level 
of uncertainty about the total number of species present in the world and current rates of species 
loss, it is impossible to know with any certainty how accurate Global 2000’s estimate of loss of 
genetic diversity actually was, even if the estimates given above suggest that that of Global 
2000 was unduly high. 
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The Resourceful Earth noted in its discussion on species loss that estimates of previous or then 
current extinction rates, which were little more than guesses anyway, were very low (up to 100 
species per year) and yet Global 2000 suggested that this rate would suddenly increase to 
around 40,000 species per year [24]. Simon and Wildavsky [24] argued that such a sudden 
deviation from the past should not normally be taken except on very strong empirical evidence 
and yet this evidence was lacking. 
 
Regardless of the exact rate of extinctions there is little doubt that the world is in the midst of a 
major extinction interval that is not sustainable since it is well above background extinction 
rates [21] although probably not unprecedented in the Earth’s history [23]. On a different note,  
Nee and May [25] argue that even when 95 percent of species are lost, approximately 80 
percent of evolutionary history is preserved, with the proportion of evolutionary history 
surviving being relatively insensitive to whether the saved species are chosen randomly or 
optimally. They note, however, that conservation concerns relate not just to the preservation of 
evolutionary history but also to other factors such as ecosystem functioning or the potential 
usefulness of lost species, hence this does not necessarily significantly diminish concern 
relating to species loss. 
 
Water Projections 
 
Global 2000 predicted a general deterioration of the global aquatic environment in its 
environmental projections chapter. Global 2000’s major projection for the state of the world’s 
freshwater resources for 2000 was derived from a 1971 estimate of water supply per capita, 
whereby the water supply per capita was then re-estimated for 2000 based upon Global 2000’s 
population projections. In other words, the projection of the state of the water resources in 2000 
was based upon a population per unit of resource index that did not take into account of the 
state of the resource nor the ability of countries to adapt to their water resource situation. Global 
 20
2000 predictions of the water situation in the year 2000 were thus no more than an extension of 
the report’s population projections. 
 
The Resourceful Earth, comments that such an estimate of water availability presented in 
Global 2000 may have little relevance to the actual situation and may even promote action in 
unproductive directions [26]. The Resourceful Earth points out that things are much more 
complicated than a population per unit of resource type index suggests. The criticisms given in 
The Resourceful Earth have been supported by subsequent trends in the water indicator 
literature where alternative methodologies have been suggested. For example, the methodology 
of defining water resources adequacy in terms of the relative size of each country’s water 
resource has been criticized by Raskin et al [27] because it does not reflect differences in 
patterns of use. A country’s per capita water use is a reflection of its level of development, 
economic structure, climatic situation, and cultural practices. Any two countries with similar 
levels of per capita water resources may have significantly different levels of usage which could 
mean that one is suffering from water stress while the other is not. 
 
Alternatives have been suggested for measuring the adequacy of water resources.   Raskin et al 
[27] suggest an index for assessing the adequacy of a nation’s water resources based upon the 
percentage of available water resources within a country which are being withdrawn for 
different uses. This better reflects the variety in water use patterns between countries than the 
methodology used in Global 2000, but it does not account for multiple in-stream usage. 
Feitelson and Chenoweth [28] propose an index which measures the adequacy of a nation’s 
water resources using economic terms since this allows the internalization of both inter-
generational and intra-generational issues in a defensible manner. The index they propose is 
based upon cost of a supplying a sufficient volume (for domestic and industrial needs) of clean 
sustainable water and sanitation to all the people of a country at all times compared to the 
nation’s gross national product. Feitelson and Chenoweth [28] suggest that affordability of 
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water supply is the real issue when assessing the adequacy of a nation’s water resources, as 
additional clean water can be had in most cases, at a cost. However, this issue was not 
addressed in either Global 2000 or The Resourceful Earth. 
 
Energy 
 
Energy projections for the coming twenty years were a major component of Global 2000 as 
these projections influenced many other factors, such as food and non-fuel mineral prices. 
 
Global 2000’s most detailed energy projects were for the years 1985 and 1990. Table 4 
compares the energy use projections given in Global 2000 for the year 1990 with the energy use 
in that year. This table shows that oil use and total energy use were significantly lower than 
predicted, while coal and natural gas usage was higher, both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of total energy use. 
 
{Table 4 about here} 
 
Global 2000 listed three different projections of US energy consumption for the year 2000, each 
calculated using different methodologies and with two of these projections listing multiple 
scenarios. Total US domestic energy consumption was predicted to be between 115.4 and 146.1 
Zettajoules7 [10]. In reality, total US domestic consumption in 2000 was 104.2 Zettajoules8, or 
25 percent of the total world energy consumption [29]. Global 2000 predicted that total world 
                                                          
7
 In original, 109.4 and 138.5 quadrillion Btu where one quadrillion Btu is equal to 0.476 
million barrels of oil per day. 
8
 98.8 quadrillion Btu 
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energy demand in 2000 would range between 557 and 663 Zettajoules9 [10]. In reality, the total 
world primary energy output in 1999 was 401 Zettajoules10 [30]. 
 
Global 2000 expressed a high degree of certainty that an increase in energy prices was to be 
expected. Therefore, a real price increase of five percent per annum was adopted as the basis of 
several calculations in Global 2000. However, between 1975-78, the period for which data were 
available when Global 2000 was prepared, the price of oil averaged just below $13 / barrel in 
current dollars, that is just below $36 / barrel in constant 1999 US dollars [31]. The figure of 
$13 / barrel (constant 1975 dollars) was adopted as the basis of calculations in Global 2000. 
While the price of oil rose very significantly but temporarily around 1980,  it declined 
afterwards, averaging around $18.50 (constant 1999 $) in the second half of the 1990s. Clearly, 
energy prices actually declined in the 1990s, contrary to predictions, and the O.P.E.C. oil 
shocks had little lasting effect on prices.11 
 
In The Resourceful Earth the discussion focused on the way global energy markets operate, and 
the effects of prices. It was noted, for example, that it is impossible for the world to “run out of 
oil” as demand outstrips supply since the consumption of oil must always equal supply, with the 
balance being achieved by prices [32]. Singer [32] argued that the oil price rises around 1980 
would lead to a decline in oil consumption in the OECD if all economic replacements to oil 
                                                          
9
 528 and 628 quadrillion Btu 
10
 380 quadrillion Btu 
11
 Oil consuming countries diversified supplied away from O.P.E.C. countries following the oil 
shock of 1980 thus reducing the influence of O.P.E.C. on prices through developing alternative 
supplies.  According to the [29] the location of the world’s proven crude oil reserves is far more 
concentrated that current production, with non-OPEC oil reserves being depleted far more 
rapidly than those of the OPEC countries, thus implying in the long term that OPEC will 
increase its domination of oil production contrary to the trends of the last twenty years. 
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were put into effect. While oil consumption did rise during the study period, it rose much more 
slowly than previous trends indicated it would, thus suggesting that the oil price rises of 1973 
and 1980 did indeed hinder the growth in oil consumption. 
 
Atmospheric problems 
 
Atmospheric problems such as global warming or the depletion of the ozone layer were not the 
issues of global prominence at the time Global 2000 or The Resourceful Earth were written that 
they later on went on to become. As with many environmental issues, the agenda has changed 
over time as new problems are identified and then research is conducted to investigate that 
nature of these problems and their seriousness. Simultaneously, other once prominent issues 
will fade from the agenda as solutions are found and implemented or the problem was found to 
be less serious than initially suspected. In the late 1970s and early 1980s knowledge about 
global warming or depletion of the ozone layer was very limited compared to today. For 
example, Global 2000 contained three climatological scenarios, namely no change, global 
warming, and global cooling, each of which was considered to be of equal probability [10]. 
Global 2000 did not predict, however, that any substantial climate change would occur before 
the year 2000 [10]. 
 
In relation to the possibility of global warming, Global 2000 noted the increasing level of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and its long term potential to cause significant global 
warming, stating that a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide would have very serious 
consequences, with some scientists predicting that such a doubling was likely to occur during 
the first half of the twenty-first century. Global 2000 suggested that it might have been 
warranted when considering future energy policies to take into consideration the carbon-dioxide 
balance of the atmosphere. Because of the vagueness of the Global 2000’s predictions in 
relation to global climate change, it is not possible to assess their accuracy other than to note 
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that Global 2000 did note the potential significance of the build up of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. 
 
The Resourceful Earth in its discussion of global climatic trends highlighted the fact that global 
climate has shown significant inter-annual and inter-decadinal variation well before there was 
any human induced build increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations [33]. 
Landsberg [33] also noted the large variation and uncertainty relating to climate predictions of 
global warming due to increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere together 
with the long time scales involved, with both of these factors reducing the likelihood of policy 
action. Like Global 2000, The Resourceful Earth did not predict any significant climate change 
prior to the year 2000, and expected climate to stay within the range of previously observed 
values and events. 
 
The sections of Global 2000 and The Resourceful Earth  on climate change appear to be, 
broadly speaking, sound given the knowledge available at the time they were written although 
neither predicted the warming trend that occurred during the study period. From the mid-1940s 
until the mid 1970s the earth went through a period of mild cooling, but since 1976 (and the 
period from 1910 to 1945) there has been a global temperature increase of 0.15º C per decade 
and since the late nineteenth century the global average surface temperature has increased 0.6º 
C [34].  Nineteen-ninety-eight was the warmest year in the instrumental record since 1861. 
 
Global 2000 also remarked upon the depletion of the ozone layer, noting that there are a 
number of anthropocentric causes of ozone depletion, even if the relative magnitude of the 
different anthropocentric causes was uncertain at the time [10]. While the date at which 
significant ozone depletion could take was unknown, it was thought that at the 1974 rate of the 
use of chlorofluoromethanes, global ozone would be reduced by 14 percent over fifty years 
[10]. 
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The Resourceful Earth said relatively little about the depletion of the ozone layer.  Landsberg 
[33] stated that with the stratospheric ozone reduction expected no appreciable alteration of 
climate at the earth’s surface was expected while assessing the medical problems due to 
increased risk of skin cancer went beyond the scope of his study. 
 
According to the United Nations Environment Program [35], current ozone losses are at six 
percent in northern mid-latitudes in winter and spring, and five percent in southern mid-
latitudes all year around. Ozone losses are 50 percent in the Antarctic spring, and 15 percent in 
the Arctic spring. Due to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol there has been a marked 
decrease in the consumption of ozone depleting substances and recovery in the ozone layer is 
expected to begin shortly [35]. While Global 2000 ozone depletion predictions for mid-latitudes 
appear reasonable with hindsight, the depletion seen over Antarctica and the Arctic was 
unexpected. 
 
Both climate change and ozone depletion were seen as problems relating to the global 
commons, thus making them both important but difficult problems to solve. While it appears 
that the problem of ozone layer depletion has been reasonably successfully dealt with (on a long 
term basis at least) during the study period, the build up of carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere 
has yet to be adequately addressed even though Global 2000 described them both as 
atmospheric problems of great consequence over the long term. Other atmospheric problems, 
such as the emission of sulfur and nitrogen oxides leading to acid rain, were mentioned in 
Global 2000 but were seen primarily as regional rather than global atmospheric problems [10]. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
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In the late 1970s Global 2000 projected a very worrisome picture of the world in the year 2000, 
suggesting that the world’s problems could become unmanageable by then if prompt action was 
not immediately taken. Conversely, The Resourceful Earth argued that global conditions were 
generally slowly improving as human ingenuity and technological development allowed society 
to deal with the problems that it faced. The positive global trends of recent history, The 
Resourceful Earth argued, were likely to continue through to the year 2000. To some extent, 
different politics and values were the major driving force of the original Global 2000 – The 
Resourceful Earth debate. 
 
It is impossible to measure the precise impact of Global 2000 on policy making over the period 
from 1980 to 2000 as it is impossible to check what the situation would now be like if it had 
never been published. Focusing policy and decision makers’ attention, as well as that of the 
general public, on major issues of concern by presenting alarming scenarios for the future may 
have played some role in leading to the policy changes that then prevented the these alarming 
scenarios from actually being realized. Thus, the projections may well have been doomed to be 
inaccurate by their very existence. However, it is difficult to believe that Global 2000 or The 
Resourceful Earth, either separately or together, could have had a major impact on the many of 
problems described. This is due to the fact that they were global problems whose management 
depended upon the actions of thousand, millions or in some cases billions of people worldwide. 
For example, it would be difficult to argue that global food production increased as dramatically 
as it did simply because Global 2000 focused the attention of certain policy makers on this issue 
twenty years ago. Furthermore, the Carter administration in the US was replaced by the Regan 
administration soon after Global 2000 was released, with the new administration largely 
rejecting the reports findings and the policy intensions behind the report. 
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Now that the year 2000 has come to pass, it appears that The Resourceful Earth was closer to 
reality than Global 2000 in most, but not all fields, even if the level of improvement in some 
areas was less than it predicted. Globally in terms of basic indicators of human well being, 
things generally got better rather than worse between 1980 and 2000 as global trends generally 
continued as The Resourceful Earth predicted they would. Specifically, in the case of fisheries, 
however, Global 2000 was more accurate. At the same time many environmental problems 
have been less severe than predicted in Global 2000, as was also expected by The Resourceful 
Earth. On a more negative note, some major problems with long term implications that were 
highlighted by Global 2000 but were played down in importance in The Resourceful Earth, 
such as the loss of genetic resources, continue to be of major concern even if they are unfolding 
more slowly than predicted by Global 2000. However, humanity has proved remarkably adept 
at achieving the seemingly impossible, such as the near doubling of global food production 
within a 30 year period so that, on average, six billion people are now being better fed than 
were four billion 25 years earlier, even if this achievement has come at significant 
environmental cost in some areas. 
 
In some cases the indices used in Global 2000 and The Resourceful Earth were inappropriate, 
as with the water indices, while in other cases, such as in relation to atmospheric problems, the 
emphasis in the discourse has now shifted. In terms of predicting the future, The Resourceful 
Earth relied heavily upon examining past trends as giving the best indication of the future. 
Global 2000 gave somewhat less emphasis to past trends and also tried to analyze directly the 
factors that it saw as being likely to influence the future. An example of this is the analysis of 
non-fuel minerals. Global 2000, while noting that the real price of most mineral commodities 
had been constant or declining for many years argued that, despite such trends, in the coming 
two decades real prices were likely to rise due to increasing energy costs, declining ore grades, 
and increased requirements for environmental protection [10]. As predicted by The Resourceful 
Earth, however, mineral price declines continued. (See Table 5.) The effectiveness of reliance 
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on past trends for providing the best indication of the future, together with the fact that the key 
indicators of human welfare show that globally things are improving lends support to the 
Cornucopian rather than neo-Malthusian perspective in the on-going debate about the state of 
the world and its direction. 
 
{Table 5 about here} 
 
It should be noted that the conclusion that as a whole The Resourceful Earth was more accurate 
than Global 2000 is based only upon the data available relating to the global situation in the 
year 2000. Global 2000’s predictions may (or may not) still come about in the future but both 
Global 2000 and The Resourceful Earth were specifically focused upon the year 2000 and thus 
it is in relation to that year which they must be judged.  It should also be noted that the 
conclusion that as a whole The Resourceful Earth was the more accurate of the two reports 
requires certain value judgments. For example, when concluding that as a whole The 
Resourceful Earth was more accurate, the overall improvements predicted by The Resourceful 
Earth in relation to global food resources must be weighed against Global 2000’s prediction 
that global fisheries as a whole were already fully exploited.  Thus other conclusions based on 
different value judgments are not necessarily excluded. 
 
While past global trends may be able to give some assurance for the future, they also have 
significant limitations. Synergetic effects can mean that a small change in one area can have a 
big effect in other areas, and individual regions can differ significantly from global projections 
and be much higher or lower. In many cases this can be the result of geo-political upheavals that 
are by their nature very difficult to forecast. Neither Global 2000 nor The Resourceful Earth 
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predicted the decline that has been experienced in the former USSR12,  nor that the trend of 
increasing life expectancy would be reversed in sub-Saharan Africa due to the unforeseen 
effects of AIDS. Similarly, threshold effects bringing sudden and severe changes could prove 
significant in relation to certain environmental problems, such as climate change, meaning that 
the analysis of past trends may provide a very poor indication of the future in some cases. 
Furthermore, sudden changes due to threshold effects, or unpredictable events with acute 
impacts could severely limit humanity’s ability to adapt by their very suddenness. Nonetheless, 
when the predictions of Global 2000 and The Resourceful Earth are compared to reality, it 
suggests that perhaps it is possible to be cautiously optimistic for the future. Just as The 
Resourceful Earth argued that there was no reason to believe that the positive trends of the 
previous few decades were likely to suddenly reverse in most cases, as was argued in Global 
2000, perhaps the same can be said now. That is not to say, however, that humanity is not 
facing formidable challenges now and into the foreseeable future that will very likely stretch 
humanity to its limits of ingenuity in order to deal with them, but rather, that past evidence 
suggests that in most cases humanity will manage to deal adequately with the more pressing of 
these problems.13 As such, this review of a major predictive neo-Malthusians report and the 
associated Cornucopian report together with the actual data for the period in question suggests 
that Cornucopian report has better stood the test of time. 
 
Cornucopian and neo-Malthusian perspectives are two polar views on the state of the global 
environment. The main difference between these two perspectives lies in their attitude towards 
                                                          
12
 In the case of the former USSR this decline can be attributed to economic and social break-
down, and thus paradoxically may support Simon’s [8]  view that human ingenuity (and the 
ability of society to tap that ingenuity) rather than absolute numbers is what is most important. 
13Major unresolved issues that require urgent attention include global warming, the provision of 
clean potable water and sanitation services, developing sustainable fisheries, and the 
preservation of biodiversity. 
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adaptive capacity although adaptive capacity is exogenous to them both. Adaptive capacity, as 
defined by Ohlsson [36] consists of a structural component that includes both institutional and 
intellectual capital for the generation of alternative solutions by technocratic elites, and a social 
component that consists of the willingness and ability of society to accept such solutions as 
being both reasonable and legitimate.  Both components may be found amongst local 
populations although this is sometimes overlooked when making predictions about the future. 
 
Neither Global 2000 nor The Resourceful Earth dealt adequately with the question of adaptive 
capacity and the use of natural resources and the environment. The predictions of Global 2000, 
for example, were based upon the assumption that there would be no significant change in 
national policies regarding natural resources management and the environment over the study 
period [10], and many of the predictions in the report indicate that no allowance was made for 
the ability of individuals or nations to react to changing prices or technological developments 
by adapting production techniques or consumption patterns. Conversely, in The Resourceful 
Earth  Simon and Kahn [9] argued that human adaptation to changes in the supply of natural 
resources was incorporated into the long run trends of supply and cost themselves and thus 
extrapolating these trends in the future assumed that such adaptation would continue. 
Empirically it can be seen that there is great variation in adaptive capacity between countries 
and regions, and over time. Thus, the real question for the forward-looking environmental 
discourse may not be the cornucopian – neo-Malthusian debate in terms of resource use or the 
extent of human impacts on the environment, but rather, assessing how global human society 
adapts to environmental (and other) challenges together with understanding what adaptation 
mechanisms are adopted and why. 
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Tables and Figures: 
Table 1: Major contributions to the Cornucopian / neo-Malthusian debate over the last 40 years 
Author(s) Book / Report title Year Perspective 
H.J. Barnett 
C. Morse 
Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of 
Natural Resource Availability 
1963 Cornucopian 
D.H. Meadows 
D.L. Meadows 
J. Randers 
W.W. Behrens 
 
The Limits to Growth: A report for the 
Club of Rome’s Project on the 
Predicament of Mankind 
1972 Neo-Malthusian 
W. Beckerman In Defense of Economic Growth 1974 Cornucopian 
G.O. Barney The Global 2000 Report to the President: 
Entering the Twenty-first Century 
1980 Neo-Malthusian 
J.L. Simon The Ultimate Resource 1981 Cornucopian 
J.L. Simon 
H Kahn (eds) 
The Resourceful Earth 1984 Cornucopian 
L.R. Brown State of the World Annually 
since 1984 
Neo-Malthusian 
P.R. Ehrlich 
J.P. Holdren (eds) 
The Cassandra Conference: Resources 
and the Human Predicament 
1988 Neo-Malthusian 
L.R. Brown 
C. Flavin 
S. Postel 
Saving the Planet 1991 Neo-Malthusian 
DH Meadows 
DL Meadows 
J Randers 
Beyond the limits: Global collapse or a 
sustainable future 
1992 Neo-Malthusian 
R. Bailey (ed) The True State of the Planet 1995 Cornucopian 
J.L. Simon The State of Humanity 1995 Cornucopian 
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Table 2: The high, medium and low population projects given in Global 2000 compared with 
the actual population levels in the year 2000. Source [10] p20-22; Actual figures for 2000 from 
[11] 
Country / 
Region 
Low 
population 
projection
: 2000 (in 
millions) 
Percentage 
difference of 
projection to 
actual 
population 
Medium 
population 
projection: 
2000 (in 
millions) 
Percentage 
difference of 
projection to 
actual 
population 
High 
population 
projection: 
2000 (in 
millions) 
Percentage 
difference of 
projection to 
actual 
population 
Actual 
estimated 
population 
in 2000 (in 
millions)14 
World 5921.75 -2.58 6351.07 4.48 6797.50 11.83 6078.68
China 1175.76 -6.87 1328.65 5.24 1467.86 16.27 1262.47
India 974.28 -2.83 1020.92 1.82 1141.90 13.88 1002.70
Philippines 66.79 -16.25 73.23 -8.17 79.77 0.04 79.74
Thailand 69.38 11.28 75.24 20.67 80.81 29.60 62.35
Egypt 58.80 -16.58 65.38 -7.25 70.53 0.06 70.49
Nigeria 128.75 4.04 134.68 8.83 136.93 10.65 123.75
Brazil 213.84 21.81 225.90 28.68 241.44 37.53 175.55
Mexico 110.60 10.21 131.32 30.86 142.02 41.53 100.35
USA 234.33 -17.00 248.37 -12.03 270.17 -4.31 282.33
Japan 128.89 1.75 132.95 4.96 135.31 6.82 126.67
South 
Korea 
53.55 13.31 56.98 20.57 61.54 30.20 47.26
 
                                                          
14
 From [11]. 
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Table 3: Total food production as projected by Global 2000 for the year 2000, versus actual 
global food production in 2000. Sources: [10] (p80-81); [37].  
Country / 
Region 
Total projected food 
production in 2000 
(1969-1971=100)15 
Total actual food 
production in 2000 
(1970=100) 
Percentage difference of 
actual food production 
from projected 
World 192.5 199.2 3.48 
Western 
Europe 
124.1 138.8594 11.89 
USSR / former 
USSR 
172.7 79.10448 -54.20 
South Asia 219.3 232.5581 6.05 
Latin America 282 240.3846 -14.76 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
201 191.8639 -4.55 
China 169 405.7737 140.10 
Japan 128.3 109.3713 -14.75 
USA 181.4 177.7461 -2.01 
 
                                                          
15
 Data are the taken from the Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption and Trade, 
Actual and Projected (Alternative I) table on pages 80-81 in Global 2000. They are the medium 
projection of the report. Where a range of data are given for the projection, the average is taken. 
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Table 4: A comparison of the world energy consumption predicted by Global 2000 for 1990 
compared to actual consumption in 1990. Source: [10]; [30]. Note: 1 Zettajoule = 1x1018 Joules 
or 1.055 quadrillion Btu. 
 1975 1990 Predicted 1990 Actual 
 Zettajoules Percent of total Zettajoules Percent of total Zettajoules Percent of total 
Oil 119 46 189 47 142 39 
Coal 72 28 81 20 95 26 
Natural gas 49 19 70 17 79 22 
Nuclear and Hydro 20 8 65 16 44 12 
Total 260 100 405 100 364 100 
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Table 5: The price of a range of minerals in 1976, in both 1976 US $ and 1998 US $, compared 
to the price of the same minerals in 1998, in 1998 US $. Source: [38]. 
Mineral Commodity 
1976 Price (1976 US $ per 
metric ton) 
1976 Price (1998 US $ 
per metric ton) 
1998 Price (1998 US $ 
per metric ton) 
Aluminum 910 2600 1400 
Chromium ore 435 1245 817 
Copper, refined 1530 4393 1734 
Lead 509 1458 992 
Silver 139900 400500 164000 
Steel 313.3 897.3 625.2 
Tin 8370 23980 8230 
Zinc 816 2337 1130 
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Figure 1: Daily per capita calorie consumption in 1973-73, projected for 2000 by Global 2000 
(Scenarios 1 and 2), and actual level in 1997-99 compared to FAO recommended minimum 
requirement. Source: [10]  p275;  [39] 
 
